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KEY TRONIC CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES: RECOVERY OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN PRIVATE COST-RECOVERY
ACTIONS UNDER CERCLA
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1980, hazardous substance regulation focused on the
prevention of hazardous waste problems.' To mitigate environmen-
tal hazards caused by existing waste sites, Congress enacted the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") 2 The function of this legislation was
to provide a mechanism for the decontamination of hazardous
waste sites and the allocation of clean-up costs among those respon-
sible for pollution.3
Under CERCLA, the federal government may issue an adminis-
trative order compelling private parties to initiate remediation of
contaminated locations, 4 or may seek a court order enjoining re-
sponsible parties to undertake response activities, 5 or may com-
mence cleanup of environmentally hazardous sites and recover
1. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") of 1976 estab-
lished standards regulating the generation, transportation, treatment, storage and
disposal of hazardous waste. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988). RCRA also authorized the Admin-
istrator of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to create additional stan-
dards. The Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA") of 1976 monitored substances
which are potentially hazardous to individuals and the environment, and estab-
lished a civil cause of action by the Administrator of EPA against a party if a site
presents an immediate hazard. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified
generally as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988))).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 ("CERCLA"), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
3. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Mardan Corp. v.
C.G.C. Music Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1455 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that section 107 of
CERCLA "authorizes both governmental and private entities to sue statutorily de-
fined 'responsible parties' to recover costs incurred in cleaning up hazardous
waste disposal sites"); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805
F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986).
4. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). CERCLA authorizes the President
to issue administrative orders requiring cleanup when the President determines
that there may be an imminent and substantial danger to the public health and
welfare or to the environment due to an actual or threatened release of a hazard-
ous substance. Id.
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costs from responsible parties.6 CERCLA promotes private cleanup
of environmental hazards by providing a party who has incurred
expenses cleaning up a contaminated site with a private cause of
action to recover response costs.7 Federal courts have consistently
held that CERCLA creates a private cause of action for the recovery
of response costs.8 However, federal circuit courts were sharply di-
6. Id. § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a). CERCLA establishes the situations in
which the federal government may initiate dean-up activities:
(1) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a sub-
stantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a
release or substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollu-
tant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial dan-
ger to the public health or welfare, the President is authorized to act,
consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for
the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazard-
ous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its re-
moval from any contaminated natural resource), or take any other
response measure consistent with the national contingency plan which
the President deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare or
the environment.
Id.
7. Id. § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4). Specifically, CERCLA imposes lia-
bility on four classes of potentially responsible parties:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity,... and containing such hazard-
ous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance....
Id. "Person" is defined as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partner-
ship, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government,
State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body." Id. § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). These parties "shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Govern-
ment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency
plan; (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person con-
sistent with the national contingency plan .. " Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
Additionally, CERCLA authorizes private parties to seek recovery of response costs
from the Hazardous Substance Superfund ("Superfund"). Id. § 111(a) (2), 42
U.S.C. § 9611(a) (2). Private claims against the Superfund require federal certifica-
tion and prior governmental approval under the National Contingency Plan
("NCP"), but private cost recovery actions do not have that requirement. Sidney M.
Wolf, Up in the Air: Recovery of Attorney Fees in a CERCEA § 107(a)(4)(B) Suit, 69 N.D.
L. REv., 275, 282 (1993).
8. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d
311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985). The court stated that "[a]llowing a private action to re-
2
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vided regarding whether CERCLA permits private party recovery of
attorneys' fees as a necessary response cost.9 The recovery of attor-
neys' fees in private cost recovery actions is a crucial issue due to
the potentially enormous financial impact upon a large number of
litigants.10 The CERCLA liability system generates transaction costs
which are manifestly high." In some remediation actions, attor-
neys' fees incurred as an expense of litigation could exceed the
clean-up costs.' 2
This Note addresses the recoverability of attorneys' fees in pri-
vate cost recovery actions, with emphasis on the main issues ad-
dressed by the United States Supreme Court in Key Tronic Corp. v.
United States.'3 In this decision, the Court held that CERCLA does
cover response costs from responsible parties under section 9607(a) (4) (B) is thus
consistent with both the language of section 9607 (a) (4) (B) and with the congres-
sional purpose underlying CERCLA as a whole." Walls, 761 F.2d at 318. In a CER-
CIA private cost recovery action, the plaintiff must prove that "(1) the site is a
facility as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9), (2) defendant is a responsible person as
defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), (3) the release or threatened release of a hazard-
ous substance has occurred, and (4) the release or threatened release has caused
the plaintiff to incur response costs." FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., 998 F.2d 842, 845
(10th Cir. 1993) (citing Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir.
1989)).
9. See FMC, 998 F.2d. at 847 (holding only non-litigation fees are recoverable);
In re Hemingway Transport, 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 303
(1993) (denying litigation fee recovery); Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir.
1993) (allowing attorney fee recovery); Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984
F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 126 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1993) (denying attor-
ney fee recovery); Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 955 F.2d 519 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding attorneys' fee non-recoverable); General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Auto-
mation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937 (1991)
(allowing recovery of litigation fees).
10. Janet Morris Jones, Comment, Attorney Fees: CERCLA Private Recovery Ac-
tions, 10 PACE ENVrL. L. Rlv. 393, 418 (1992). In 1989, an average cleanup of a
waste site cost $26,000,000 exclusive of transaction costs; potentially responsible
parties ("PRPs") spent $6,100,000, and insurance companies expended approxi-
mately $410,000,000. Id.; see Kanad S. Virk, General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial
Automation Systems, Inc.: Are Attorney Fees Recoverable in CERCLA Private Cost Recovery
Actions?, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1541, 1566 (1991). "The total number of cost recovery
actions filed has increased since 1988. Attorneys have noted a growing awareness
on the part of potential industrial plaintiffs regarding the availability of environ-
mental law remedies." Virk, supra, at 1566.
11. SeeJones, supra note 10, at 419. A study conducted by the Rand Corpora-
tion in 1992 revealed that transaction costs composed 88% of insurance compa-
nies' total clean-up costs. Furthermore, large industrial firms' transaction costs
amounted to 21% of their total expenses. Id.
12. GeneralElec. Co., 920 F.2d at 1422 (noting that "[t]he litigation costs could
easily approach or even exceed response costs."). General Electric Company's total
response costs amounted to $940,000, of which $419,000 were attorneys' fees. Id. at
1417; see alsoJ. Christopher Jordan, Recovery of Attorneys'Fees in Private Contribution
Actions Pursuant to CERCLA Section 107(a)(4)(B), 10 REv. LrrG. 823, 834 (1991).
13. 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994). For a discussion of Key Tronic, see infra notes 103-
37 and accompanying text.
3
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not authorize the award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in
a private cost recovery action.' 4 However, recovery was granted for
non-litigation related legal expenses which were closely associated
to the actual clean-up and, thus, constituted a necessary cost of re-
sponse under section 107(a) (4) (B) of CERCLA. 15 In analyzing
whether attorneys' fees should be recoverable as response costs
under CERCLA, this Note first examines CERCLA's statutory
framework and the award of attorneys' fees under the traditional
American Rule on costs.' 6 Next, this Note reviews statutory inter-
pretation and evaluates relevant case law dealing with the awarding
of attorneys' fees under CERCLA.17 Part III of this Note presents an
analysis of the Key Tronic decision, describing the holding and the
rationale behind the opinion of the Court.'8 Part IV then critiques
the Key Tronic decision and asserts that the Court's narrow interpre-
tation of enforcement activities coupled with strict adherence to the
explicitness requirements established by the Court in Alyeska Pipe-
line Service Co. v. Wilderness Society19 and Runyon v. McCrar 0 results
in no infringement upon the discretion of the legislature and no
erosion of the American Rule.21 Finally, Part V of this Note con-
cludes that the Key Tronic decision is consistent with prior decisions
of the Court because the Court declines to create rights not specifi-
cally enumerated in the statute.2 2 In Key Tronic, the Court does not
preclude the future availability of the recovery of attorneys' fees,
but defers to the legislative power of Congress to affirmatively grant
recovery.23
14. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1968. For a discussion of the Key Tronic decision
regarding attorneys' fees incurred in litigation, see infra notes 111-23 and accom-
panying text.
15. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1968. For a discussion of the Key Tronic holding
regarding the issue of non-litigation related attorneys' fees, see infra notes 124-30
and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of CERCLA's statutory framework and the American
Rule, see infra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of statutory interpretation, see infra notes 44-66 and ac-
companying text. Additionally, for a discussion of case law relevant to the recovery
of attorneys' fees in private cost recovery actions under CERCLA, see infra notes
67-100 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the issues and the Court's reasoning in Key Tronic, see
infra notes 103-37 and accompanying text.
19. 421 U.S. 241 (1975).
20. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
21. For a critical analysis of the Key Tronic decision, see infra notes 138-79 and
accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of decisions restricting judicial enhancement of statutory
language, see infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the impact of the Key Tronic decision, see infra notes
180-203 and accompanying text.
4
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II. BACKGROUND
Determining whether attorneys' fees should be recoverable as
a response cost requires an assessment of the scope of cost recovery
available to a private party under CERCLA. This section examines
the textual statutory authorization of cost recovery under CERCLA
in its amended version, discusses the American Rule and its applica-
tion to the recovery of attorney fees, and traces conflicting federal
court decisions regarding the recoverability of legal fees in a CER-
CLA private cost recovery action.24
A. Statutory Authorization of Cost Recovery Under CERCLA
CERCLA authorizes two cost recovery causes of action for
private parties who have incurred response costs in the decontami-
nation of hazardous waste sites. Private parties may seek reimburse-
ment from the Hazardous Substances Superfund ("Superfund") 2 if
they have incurred such response costs and proved nonliability.26
Private parties may also sue other "potentially responsible parties"
("PRPs") 27 for contribution to the recovery of any "necessary costs
of response."28
Although the phrase "costs of response" is not specifically de-
lineated within CERCLA, section 101 (25) defines "response" as "re-
moval, remedy, and remedial action."29 Section 101 (25) states that
24. For a discussion of the statutory authorization of CERCLA, see infra notes
25-36 and accompanying text. Additionally, for a discussion of the conflicting cir-
cuit court decisions regarding the recoverability of attorneys' fees, see infra notes
67-102 and accompanying text.
25. CERCLA § 106(b) (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (2) (A). Congress estab-
lished the Superfund to provide funding for decontamination of hazardous waste
sites. 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988). The Superfund may be used for the payment of
governmental response costs under CERCLA § 104 and for the "[p]ayment of any
claim for necessary response costs incurred by any other person as a result of carry-
ing out the national contingency plan established under section 1321(c) of tide 33
and amended by section 9605 of this title." CERCLA § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611
(a).
26. CERCLA § III(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2); see also id. § 109(b), 42
U.S.C. § 9609(b).
27. Id. § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4). For further discussion of the four
classes of PRPs as defined under CERCLA, see supra note 7.
28. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B). For further discus-
sion of the right of private parties to sue other PRPs for contribution, see supra
notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
29. CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). A "removal action" is one
which focuses on an immediate hazard caused by toxic waste. Id. § 101(23), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(23). "Removal" is defined as follows:
[T]he cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the en-
vironment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the
threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such ac-
5
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"all such terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial ac-
tion') include enforcement activities related thereto."30 However,
CERCLA contains no precise statutory definition of the term "en-
forcement activities." This statutory silence has left room for con-
flicting federal court interpretations as to whether attorneys' fees
incurred in private recovery actions fall within the scope of "en-
forcement activities," and are recoverable as a "cost of response"
under CERCLA.31
Another source of inconsistent interpretation is CERCIA's tex-
tual differences in the authorization of cost recovery to the federal
government and to private parties. Section 107(a) (4) (A) holds re-
sponsible parties liable for "all costs of removal or remedial action
incurred by the United States government ... not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan."3 2 In a private recovery action, sec-
tion 107 (a) (4) (B) holds responsible parties liable for "any other
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan."33 Interpretative differences
arise between the substantive content of the federal government's
authorization to recover "all costs" and the "necessary costs" which
are awarded to private parties.34 Although courts have affirmed re-
dons as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or
threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed mate-
rial, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent,
minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the
environment, which may otherwise result from a release or a threat of
release ....
Id. § 101 (23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
"Remedy" or "remedial" is defined as follows:
[T]hose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in
addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize
the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause
substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the
environment ....
Id. § 101 (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (24).
30. Id. § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). The 1986 Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act ("SARA") amended the definition of "response" to in-
clude the term "enforcement activities." See Heather M. Harvey, Note, TheAvailabil-
ity of Attorney's Fees as a Necessary Cost of Response in Private Cost-Recovery Actions Under
CERCLA, 26 U. Rim. L. Rav. 213, 227 (1991).
31. For a discussion of conflicting interpretations in federal circuit court
cases, see supra note 9. Additionally, for a discussion of federal district court cases
which embody dissimilar interpretations, see infra note 101.
32. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (4) (A).
33. Id. § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B).
34. Hemingway, 993 F.2d at 934 (holding attorneys' fees are not recoverable to
private parties in "enforcement activity"); General Elec., 920 F.2d at 1421-22 (hold-
ing private cost recovery is within meaning of "enforcement activity").
6
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covery of attorneys' fees by the government,3 5 there have been in-
consistent judicial awards of fees as "necessary costs of response" in
private party litigation.3 6
B. The American Rule
In England, courts have been statutorily empowered to award
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party.37 However, in 1796 the
United States Supreme Court held that litigating parties are respon-
sible for their own attorneys' fees absent express statutory authori-
zation.3 8 This "American Rule" was reaffirmed by the Court in
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society.3 9 The rule denies
arbitrary judicial awards of litigation fees and mandates that parties
in litigation must sustain the expense of their own attorneys' fees.40
The Alyeska Pipeline Court held that attorneys' fees may be awarded
only if there is specific statutory authorization. 4 1 Similarly, in Run-
35. Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 951, 957 (E.D.
Mich. 1992) (commenting that section 104(b) (1) specifically authorizes the gov-
ernment to seek attorneys' fees); see also United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceu-
tical and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
36. For a list of conflicting federal circuit court holdings, see supra note 9.
Additionally, for a list of conflicting federal district court decisions, see infra note
101.
37. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247; see Virk, supra note 10, at 1543 (citing Statute of
Gloucester, 1278, 6 EDW. 1, Ch. 1). Currently in England, "taxing masters" conduct
hearings to determine the applicable award of litigation fees. Virk, supra note 10,
at 1543 n.17.
38. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). In the United States,
the recovery of attorneys' fees is generally denied, and "even if that practice were
not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till [sic] it
is changed, or modified, by statute." Id. at 310.
39. 421 U.S. 240, 270-71. Environmental groups sued to prevent the issuance
of permits which were required in the construction of the Trans-Alaska oil pipe-
line. Id. at 241. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that the
environmental groups had represented the statutory rights of all citizens and were
entitled to attorneys' fees in order to encourage private parties to initiate litigation
which benefits the public. Id. at 245-46. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that
under the American Rule, the prevailing party may not recover attorneys' fees,
unless there is statutory authorization. Id. at 270.
40. Id. at 247.
41. Id. at 269. The Court stated that attorneys' fees may be awarded only
where Congress has "carve[d] out specific exceptions to a general rule that federal
courts cannot award attorneys' fees...." Id. There are two other common law
exceptions to the American Rule. See Virk, supra note 10, at 1544 n.25. First, the
bad faith exception occurs when a court deems that a litigant has acted in "bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Id. (quoting F.D. Rich Co.
v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)). Secondly,
the common fund exception prevents unjust enrichment by awarding attorneys'
fees to a litigant'who is successful in an action to prevent erosion of a fund in
which he and others have a mutual interest. Id. at 1544-45 n.25.
1995]
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yon,42 the Court determined that the recovery of attorneys' fees re-
quires "explicit congressional authorization." 43
C. Statutory Interpretation
Judicial determination of the existence of an explicit statutory
mandate is crucial to the recoverability of attorneys' fees under
CERCLA.44 In determining the existence of statutory authorization,
courts have traditionally looked first to the plain language of a stat-
ute.45 Furthermore, plain language purists determine the meaning
of a statute by focusing on its actual words.46 The purist isolates the
drafter's grammar and style in an attempt to eliminate judicial
bias.47 However, CERCLA's statutory language is burdened with a
42. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 185.
43. Id. The Court stated that "the law of the United States ... has always been
that absent explicit congressional authorization, attorneys' fees are not a recover-
able cost of litigation." Id. Congress has enacted numerous statutes which directly
provide for the recovery or redistribution of attorneys' fees. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260
n.33. For a discussion of the explicit statutory authorization of attorney's fees
within CERCLA, see infra note 70 and accompanying text.
44. SeeJones, supra note 10, at 401. Courts which have found no explicit provi-
sion for attorneys' fees have denied their award. For further discussion of federal
district and federal circuit court cases denying the recovery of attorneys' fees, see
infra notes 67-88 and accompanying text.
45. Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151, 2157 (1993) (comment-
ing that "[t]he starting point in interpreting a statute is its language."). Justice
Scalia has written that "[i]t is our task, as I see it, not to enter the minds of the
members of Congress-who need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to
be both lawful and effective-but rather to give fair and reasonable meaning to
the text of the Ulited States Code, adopted by various Congresses at various
times." Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1989); see Cadillac Fairview/
California v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir. 1988) (resolving issue
based on the plain language of CERCLA).
46. SeeJones, supra note 10, at 402 (commenting that since there is no express
statutory authorization for recovery of attorneys' fees to private party litigants,
plain meaning purists would disallow recovery); see also William D. Popkin, Law-
making Responsibility and Statutory Interpretation, 68 IND. LJ. 865, 872-875 (1993)
(discussing surface textualism). The author stated that "[m]eaning is plain when
writer and audience share an understanding about the text's meaning (hence,
'common understanding' is a synonym for 'plain meaning')." Popkin, supra, at
873. However, plain language has been postulated as transcending the dictionary
meaning of each word. See A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and
Context in Statutory Interpretation 17 HARv.J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 71, 73 (1994) (stating
"[a] statute, however, cannot be understood merely by understanding the words in
it."); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 17 HAR.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 67 (1994).Justice Easterbrook commented that
"'[pllain meaning' as a way to understand language is silly. In interesting cases,
meaning is not 'plain'; it must be imputed; and the choice among meanings must
have a footing more solid ... [than] a dictionary-which is a museum of words.
." Easterbrook, supra, at 67.
47. See Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 63. The author stated that "[o]ne thing
we wish the legal system to do is to give understandable commands, consistently
8
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lack of clarity and poor drafting, which has been attributed to its
hasty consideration and enactment,48 and does not easily yield to a
"plain language" interpretation.49 Ambiguities are abundant due to
CERCLA's sparse definitions which have compounded the com-
plexities of textual interpretation.50 In West Virginia University Hospi-
tals, Inc. v. Casey,5' the Supreme Court stated that a statutory
ambiguity presented to the court for the first time must be con-
strued "to contain that permissible meaning which fits most logi-
cally and comfortably into the body of both previously and
subsequently enacted law."5 2 Thus, dual interpretations of a stat-
ute's textual language encourage examination of its amendments.
A court may also look at the surrounding language and textual syn-
tax of the statute as a whole to determine the meaning of a statutory
phrase 53  in accordance with the linguistic canons of
interpretation.5
The maxim "inclusio unus exclusio alterius" indicates that the
inclusion of one entity is evidence of the intent to exclude an-
interpreted .... Id. Furthermore, "[a] nother thing political society wishes to do is
confine judges." Id.; see generally Jones, supra note 10, at 402.
48. Dedham, 805 F.2d at 1080. CERCLA's legislative history is "indefinite if not
contradictory." Id. After three years of deliberation, CERCLA was enacted as the
result of a "last minute compromise." Id. At the close of its ninety-sixth session,
Congress quickly passed CERCIA in response to severe contamination and public
health hazards. Eric D. Kaplan, Attorney Fee Recovery Pursuant to CERCLA Section
107(a)(4)(B), 42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 251, 253-54 (1992) (citing Bulk
Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Fa. 1984) (stat-
ing that "CERCLA's legislative history is riddled with uncertainty because
lawmakers hastily drafted the bill, and because last minute compromises forced
changes that went largely unexplained.")).
49. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 373 (1986); Dedham, 805 F.2d at 1080
(citing United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985)) (stating that
"CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely drafted provisions
and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history"); see Mardan, 804 F.2d at
1458 (noting that CERCLA is a poorly drafted statute, lacking clarity and preci-
sion). The definition of the term "response costs" has been problematic. Id.; see
generally Wolf, supra note 7, at 277-78.
50. See Kaplan, supra note 48, at 256. The Third Circuit stated that "CERCLA
is not a paradigm of clarity or precision.... Problems of interpretation have arisen
from the Act's use of inadequately defined terms." Id. at 256 n.32 (citing Artesian
Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988)).
51. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
52. Id. at 100.
53. See Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 61. The meaning of a word may be im-
puted from its context, other words within the text, and social and linguistic con-
ventions. Id.
54. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 921, 923 (1992) (noting that in Supreme Court deliberations there is in-
creased reliance on linguistic cannons).
9
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other.55 The concept that words take shape from those around
them is embodied in the maxim "ejusdem generis," demonstrating
that the use of a phrase in context narrows the broad scope of the
meaning it may have had as a term in isolation.56 Alternatively, if
the language of a statute is rendered unclear after plain meaning
and contextual analysis, courts consult the statute's legislative his-
tory to determine the intent of Congress.57 In recent years, how-
ever, the Court's reliance on legislative history in statutory
interpretation has declined.58 Generalizations about legislative in-
tent may be inaccurate,59 and CERCLA's legislative history is
sparse.60
55. Id. at 927. The Supreme Court utilized the maxim "exclusio alterius" in
determining that a statute which specifically permitted the Attorney General, a
railroad employee or collective bargaining representative to bring a particular
cause of action, excluded a passenger from instituting such a suit, because the
statute did not specifically empower a "passenger" to bring suit. Id. at 929 (citing
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
458 (1974)).
56. Id. at 929. In the interpretation of a state statute which referred to a "dag-
ger, dirk, stiletto or other dangerous weapon," a federal district court used the
maxim "ejusdem generis" to determine that the statute did not encompass the use
of a rifle because the statutorily specified weapons were used to stab victims, not to
shoot them. Id. at 930-31 (citing People v. Smith, 225 N.W.2d 165, 166-67 (Mich.
1975)).
57. Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386 (1992). Legislative history should be
considered only if there is statutory ambiguity. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896; Mardan, 804
F.2d at 1458. In Mardan, the court stated that in a case which implicates a federal
statute, "the predominant consideration must be Congressional intent." 804 F.2d
at 1458. To avoid lengthy debates on statutory language, legislators often try to
obtain clarity by explaining their intent in committee reports and floor statements.
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L.
REv. 845, 872 (1992). However, some critics "maintain that it is constitutionally
improper to look beyond a statute's language, or that searching for 'congressional
intent' is a semi-mystical exercise like hunting the snark." Id. at 846.
58. See Breyer, supra note 57, at 846. In 1981, the Court referred to legislative
history in almost every statutory case, but in 1990, 19 of 55 had no such analysis. Id.
59. See id. at 861-69. A frequent criticism of legislative history in statutory in-
terpretation is that the legislative history is more ambiguous than the statutory
language. Id. at 861. A statute enacted by Congress has received the majority of
votes from both houses of the legislature, and a presidential signature, but the
reports and floor speeches have not. Furthermore, unelected members of the con-
gressional staff or lobbyists often write the floor statements, reports, messages and
testimony which compose the legislative history. Id. at 863. Judge Easterbrook
stated that "society wishes to... confine judges" and to "empower Congress." Eas-
terbrook, supra note 46, at 63. Mr. Randolph comments that it is "[b] etter then to
restrict judges to the text of the statute than to have them rummaging through
committee reports and floor debates, where they are bound to get lost." Randolph,
supra note 46, at 74.
60. See Harvey, supra note 30, at 223. Lack of legislative history necessitates
close examination of CERCLA's language. Id. (citing Pease & Curren Ref. Inc. v.
Spectrolab Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1990)).
10
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Policy considerations may also be a factor in statutory interpre-
tation. Courts have held that because CERCLA is a remedial statute,
it should be interpreted broadly.6' Even though a broad interpreta-
tion would further the policies of CERCLA, if there is a clear statu-
tory difference in the treatment of two issues, the courts must not
treat them alike.6 2
Statutory silence must not be interpreted to be evidence of af-
firmative congressional intent.63 In Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank,6 4 the Court asserted that Congress' failure to act cannot be
construed as approval of the courts' statutory interpretation. 65 The
Court also stated that a statute cannot be amended by congres-
sional inaction.66
D. Conflicting Judicial Interpretations
Some courts have held that CERCLA contains no explicit au-
thorization for the recovery of attorneys' fees in private cost recov-
ery actions and have therefore refused to award them.67 For
example, the court in In re Hemingway Transport, Inc.68 denied recov-
ery of attorneys' fees because explicit authorization was absent.69
The court reasoned that since there are sections of CERCLA that
explicitly provide for attorneys' fees in other types of actions, the
absence of such language in section 1076(a) indicates a lack of con-
gressional intent in the private cost recovery context.70 This is af-
61. Dedham, 805 F.2d at 1081.
62. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 101 (stating that "it is not our func-
don to eliminate clearly expressed inconsistency of policy, and to treat alike sub-
jects that different Congresses have chosen to treat differently.").
63. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1452 (1994); West
Virginia Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 101 (citing Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245,
250-51 (1926) (stating that "[t]o supply omissions transcends the judicial
function")).
64. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
65. Id. at 1453 (stating "[W] e walk on quicksand when we try to find in the
absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.").
66. Id. Congress may legislate only by direct action, composed of the passage
of a bill by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the signature of
the President. Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1
(1989)).
67. For a discussion of court decisions denying recovery of attorneys' fees, see
infra notes 67-88 and accompanying text.
68. 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1993).
69. Id. at 934. In Hemingway, Juniper Development Group initiated a cost re-
covery action against the Hemingway-Bristol estate for response costs already in-
curred, future anticipated costs, and for $54,000 in attorneys' fees. Id.
70. Id.; seeVirk, supra note 10, at 1561. CERCIA provides for recovery of attor-
neys' fees by employee whistle-blowers in § 110(c), and by prevailing parties in
private citizen suits in § 310. Virk, supra note 10, at 1561. Section 112(c) (3) allows
11
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finned by the fact that Congress did not explicitly establish recovery
of attorneys' fees as a cost of response in the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"). 7 ' The First Circuit con-
cluded that statutory silence, by negative implication, suggests that
a private party may not recover attorneys' fees.7 2 Although the re-
medial goals of CERCLA might be advanced by legal fee recovery,
the Hemingway court stated that Congress must specifically author-
ize such recovery.75 Similarly, in Regan v. Chery Corp.,74 a district
court held that attorneys' fees were not recoverable because of the
absence of statutory authorization. The court asserted that if Con-
gress intended private party recovery of attorneys' fees, it could
have amended section 107 of CERCLA to specifically provide for it
when the 1986 SARA amendments were enacted. 75 In Stanton Road
Associates v. Lohrey Enterprises,76 the Ninth Circuit denied an award
of attorneys' fees in a private cost recovery action. 77 The court rea-
soned that although legal fees may be incurred in a private re-
sponse action, they are not "necessary costs of response" unless
explicitly authorized by Congress. 78 The judiciary may not imply the
authority to award attorneys' fees. 79 Subsequently, in Louisiana-Pa-
cific v. Asarco Inc.,80 the Ninth Circuit held that attorneys' fees were
not recoverable under CERCLA, but that litigation expenses, ex-
cluding legal costs, could be awarded.8'
the Attorney General to recoup attorneys' fees expended in the recovery of
Superfund compensation. Id.
71. Hemingway, 993 F.2d at 934.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 706 F. Supp. 145, 147 (D.R.I. 1989).
75. Id. at 148; see Santa Fe Realty Corp. v. United States, 780 F. Supp. 687, 687
(E.D. Cal. 1991) (commenting that if Congress intended citizens seeking recovery
of response costs to recover attorneys' fees, it would have simply amended CER-
CLA § 107 to provide for recovery).
76. 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993).
77. Id. at 1020. The district court awarded Stanton Road Associates $77,374 in
response costs and $126,198 in attorneys' fees. Id. at 1016.
78. Id. at 1019. The Stanton Road court contrasted the lack of explicit authori-
zation of private party recovery of attorneys' fees under § 107 of CERCLA, with
§§ 110(c), 112(c) (3) and 310 which expressly provide recovery. The Ninth Circuit
determined that the term "enforcement activities" was outside the scope of "cus-
tomary fee shifting language." Id. (citing Santa Fe Realty, 780 F. Supp. at 695).
79. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1019. The Ninth Circuit determined that the
recovery of attorneys' fees could not be implied merely because recovery would
enhance public policy. The court concluded that "to uphold the district court's
award of attorney's fees in a private response action, we would have to read into
the statute words not explicitly inserted by Congress." Id.
80. 6 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1993).
81. Id. at 1342. The court in Louisiana-Pacific upheld the award of litigation
expenses, exclusive of attorneys' fees, stating they were generally authorized by
12
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The Tenth Circuit refused to award attorneys' fees in FMC v.
Aero Industries, Inc.,82 and determined that although the phrase
"costs of response" included related "enforcement activities," it did
not provide explicit authorization of attorneys' fees.83 However, the
court distinguished attorneys' fees composing non-litigation ex-
penses, because they are not encompassed under the American
Rule and are therefore not denied as a matter of law.84 The court
held that non-litigation attorneys' fees are recoverable if deemed a
"necessary cost of response" under section 107(a) (4) (B).115
In Fallowfield Development Corp. v. Strunk,86 a Federal District
Court maintained that the phrase "enforcement activities" was in-
cluded only to establish the Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA") authority to recover attorneys' fees and enforcement
costs. 87 This decision held that only the government can "enforce"
a statute; thus, private parties cannot incur "enforcement costs." 8
Federal Courts of Appeals that permit the recovery of litigation
fees have determined that CERCLA provides explicit statutory au-
thorization for recovery, and have concluded that litigation repre-
sents a necessary cost of response.89 In General Electric Co. v. Litton
Industries Automation Systems Inc.,90 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
American Rule's applicability. Examining the textual language, the
court held that CERCLA authorizes private party recovery of attor-
neys' fees "with the sufficient degree of explicitness" required in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) to be awarded to the prevailing party in
federal court litigation. Id.
82. 998 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1993).
83. Id. at 847. The court in FMC recognized that the recovery of legal fees
would help effectuate the remedial goal of CERCLA; however, it held that "an
exception to the American rule is a policy decision that must be made by Congress,
not the courts. The desirability of a fee-shifting provision cannot substitute for the
express authorization mandated by the Supreme Court." Id.
84. Id. The FMC court concluded that the American Rule only includes attor-
neys' fees incurred in litigation. Id. For a discussion of the American Rule, see
supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
85. FMC, 998 F.2d at 848. The court determined that to qualify as a necessary
cost of response, an expenditure "must be necessary to the containment and
cleanup of hazardous releases." Id. (citing United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436,
1446 (10th Cir. 1992)).
86. 766 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
87. Id. at 359.
88. Id.; see T & E Indus. Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp 696, 708 n.13
(D.NJ. 1988).
89. For a discussion of decisions denying recovery of attorneys' fees, see supra
notes 67-88 and accompanying text.
90. 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990). The district court ordered Litton to pay
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Runyon and Alyeska.91 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that attorneys'
fees are a cost which is incurred in a private cost recovery action,
and a private cost recovery action is an "enforcement action" en-
compassed by the statute.92 The court concluded that "it would
strain the statutory language to the breaking point" to exclude at-
torneys' fees from the "necessary costs" of section 107(a) (4) (B) of
CERCLA.93 The General Electric court justified this conclusion by
stating that the award of litigation fees is consistent with CERCLA's
dual objectives of the prompt decontamination of hazardous waste
sites and the assignment of costs to responsible parties.9 4 The court
reasoned that since the cost of attorneys' fees expended in litiga-
tion could equal or exceed the clean-up costs, denial of recovery
would give a party a reduced incentive to clean up a site and initiate
a cost recovery action.95
In Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co.,96 the Eighth Circuit followed
its own reasoning in the General Electric decision.97 The Gopher Oil
court's holding affirmed the principle that a prevailing party in a
private cost recovery action is authorized to recover attorneys' fees
under CERCLA section 107(a) (4) (B).98 The Sixth Circuit awarded
recovery of attorneys' fees in a CERCLA private cost recovery action
in Donahey v. Bogle.99 The court was persuaded by the policy consid-
eration that the prompt clean up of waste sites could be defeated by
burdening private parties with the costs of legal fees incurred in
litigation.1 00
91. Id. at 1422. In GeneralElec., the court explained that in order to ascertain
explicit authorization, it was necessary to find within the statute a "dear expression
of Congress' intent" which consists of more than "generalized commands." Id. at
1421. For further discussion of Alyeska, see supra notes 39-41 and accompanying
text. Additionally, for further discussion of Runyon, see supra note 42 and accompa-
nying text.




96. 955 F.2d 519 (8th Cir. 1992). The district court in Gopher Oil awarded
Gopher $559,380.52 in attorneys' fees. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the portion of
the award related to the CERCLA cost recovery action, but remanded the case
back to the district court for exclusion of the legal fees procured in an ancillary
fraud case. Id.
97. Id. at 527.
98. Id.; see also United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co. Inc, 980 F.2d. 478,
490 (8th Cir. 1992) (relying on General Elec. in holding that attorneys' fees are
recoverable in a CERCLA § 113 action).
99. 987 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir. 1993). The Sixth Circuit overturned the trial
court's denial of recovery of legal fees amounting to $279,000. Id.
100. I& The court noted the following as a persuasive argument:
14
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The conflicting interpretations among the federal circuits' 0 '
regarding the statutory authorization of attorneys' fees in private
cost recovery actions under CERCLA led the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in Key Tronic to resolve the controversy. 10 2
III. KEY TRONIC V. UNITED STATES
In Key Tronic, the Supreme Court addressed three aspects of
the recovery of attorneys' fees in a private cost recovery action
under CERCLA: (1) the recovery of litigation fees incurred in pros-
ecuting a response cost recovery action, (2) the recovery of legal
fees expended in the identification of other potentially responsible
parties, and (3) the recovery of legal costs incurred in the prepara-
tion for, and negotiation of, a consent decree with EPA.'03
A. Facts and Procedural Disposition
During the 1970s, Key Tronic Corporation, the United States
Air Force and other parties disposed of liquid chemicals at the Col-
bert Landfill in Washington state.'04 In 1980, the Washington De-
partment of Ecology tested drinking water surrounding the landfill
Congress intended § 107 as a powerful incentive for these parties to ex-
pend their own funds initially without waiting for the responsible persons
to take action. The court can conceive of no surer method to defeat this
purpose than to require private parties to shoulder the financial burden
of the very litigation that is necessary to recover these costs.
Id. (quoting Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991) (cita-
tions omitted)).
101. For a discussion of the conflicting federal circuit court decisions, see
supra notes 67-100 and accompanying text. Furthermore, various federal district
court decisions have contrasting holdings. See, e.g., Hillsboro County v. A & E Road
Oiling Serv., 853 F. Supp. 1402 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (authorizing recovery of attor-
neys' fees); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Virginia v. Peck Iron & Metal Co.,
826 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Va. 1993) (permitting recovery of attorneys' fees); Amcast
Indus. Corp v. Detrex Corp., 822 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (allowing attorney
fee recovery); Hastings Bldg. Prod., Inc. v. National Aluminum Corp., 815 F. Supp.
228 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (holding private party litigation costs including attorneys'
fees are recoverable as response costs); Alloy Briquetting Corp. v. Niagra Vest Inc.,
802 F. Supp 943 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying recovery of attorneys' fees); Anspec Co.
Inc. v. Johnson Controls Inc., 788 F. Supp 951 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (denying recov-
ery); Santa Fe Realty, 780 F. Supp. at 687 (denying recovery); Fallowfield Dev. Corp.,
766 F. Supp. at 335 (denying recovery); Bolin, 759 F. Supp. at 692 (permitting
recovery of attorneys' fees); NewYork v. SCA Serv. Inc., 754 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (denying recovery); Pease & Curran, 744 F. Supp. at 945 (allowing recovery);
Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (permitting recovery);
Regan, 706 F. Supp. at 145 (denying recovery); T & E Indus., 680 F. Supp. at 696
(denying recovery of attorneys' fees in a private cost recovery action).
102. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1960.
103. Id. at 1964-69.
104. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 865, 866 (E.D. Wash.
1991).
15
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and determined that it was contaminated with toxins.1 05 Key Tronic
Corporation expended necessary clean-up costs in response to this
discovery,10 6 and subsequently entered into a consent decree with
EPA.'0 7 After Key Tronic established CERCLA liability against the
United States Air Force in a section 107 contribution claim for re-
sponse costs expended prior to the consent decree with EPA, the
United States and Key Tronic negotiated a consent decree. 08 In
Key Tronic Co. v United States,'0 9 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Washington held that a private party may
recover enforcement costs, including attorneys' fees, incurred in
bringing a cost recovery action under CERCLA. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit denied Key Tronic recovery of attorneys' fees in-
curred in the prosecution of the action, in the identification of
PRPs and in the preparation and negotiation of the consent
decree."10
B. The Key Tronic Decision and Its Reasoning
1. Recoverability of litigation fees expended in private cost recovery
actions
In the Key Tronic decision, the United States Supreme Court
individually addressed three specific aspects of private party recov-
ery of attorneys' fees. The initial issue was the recovery of litigation
fees incurred by a private party in prosecuting a response cost re-
105. Id.
106. Id. Key Tronic asserted that it voluntarily spent $1,271,511.10 in response
to the discovery of the hazardous waste disposal site. Id.
107. Id. In accordance with the consent decree, Key Tronic agreed to pay
$4,400,000 in dean-up costs. Id. Likewise, the Air Force entered into a consent
decree, agreeing to pay $1,450,000 in remediation expenses. Id.
108. Key Tronic, 766 F. Supp. at 866. This consent decree did not resolve the
issue of liability for the attorneys' fees expended by Key Tronic in the prosecution
of the private cost recovery action. Id. Furthermore, no determination was made
regarding liability for legal fees incurred in the negotiation of the consent decree,
and the identification of additional PRPs, which amounted to $365,649. Id.
109. Id. at 872. The district court in Key Tronic construed the provisions of
§ 107 and § 101(25) of CERCLA liberally, and held that attorneys' fees expended
in litigation were recoverable. Id. The court also held that the search for responsi-
ble parties is an "enforcement activity" and the attorneys' fees incurred are recov-
erable as necessary response costs. Id. Attorneys' fees expended in negotiation of
the consent decree were deemed to be necessary response costs and therefore re-
coverable. Id.
110. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 984 F.2d 1025, 1027-28 (9th Cir.
1993). The Ninth Circuit followed the decision in Stanton Road, and held that
attorneys' fees incurred in a private response cost recovery action were not recover-
able because of lack of explicit congressional authorization. Key Tronic, 984 F.2d at
1027-28.
16
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covery action."1 The Court held that section 107 of CERCLA does
not authorize the recovery of private litigants' attorneys' fees in-
curred in a private cost recovery action.1 2
Reasoning that a private party's action to recover clean-up costs
from other PRPs is encompassed by the term "enforcement activi-
ties" included in CERCLA section 101(25), Key Tronic contended
that attorneys' fees are recoverable as "necessary costs of response"
under section 107(a) (4) (B), of CERCLA.113 This argument was re-
jected for three reasons.
First, the Court reaffirmed the American Rule, that absent "ex-
plicit congressional authorization," attorneys' fees are not recover-
able as a cost of litigation.114 The Court stated that since a cause of
action for private cost recovery is not explicit in the text of section
107, it would be unprecedented to declare that this section of the
statute, which only "impliedly" authorizes a cause of action, pro-
vides authorization of attorneys' fees with the degree of explicitness
required under Alyeska. 115
Second, the Court stated that the absence of explicit authoriza-
tion is not dispositive if "the statute otherwise evinces an intent to
provide for such fees," 1 6 and the intent is not expressed in "gener-
alized commands."'1 7 In determining the existence of congres-
sional statutory intent, the Court contrasted two SARA amendments
that contain an explicit authorization of attorneys' fees"18 with sec-
111. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1964-69.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1965. The petitioner's brief stated that the Court should reverse
the decision of the Ninth Circuit and award recovery of attorneys' fees utilizing the
following rationale: federal courts have consistently held that the statutory lan-
guage in CERCLA § 101(25) authorizes recovery of costs of "enforcement activi-
ties," entitling the United States to recover attorney's fees when it brings an action
under § 107(a). Petitioner's Brief at 11-12, Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994) (No.
93-376). If it were the intent of Congress that attorneys' fees were only recoverable
by the government, it would be redundant to amend CERCLA to permit litigants
to recover the costs of "enforcement activities." Id.
114. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1964 (citing Runyon, 427 U.S. at 185). For a
discussion of the American Rule, see supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
115. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1966. For a discussion of Alyeska, see supra notes
39-41 and accompanying text.
116. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965.
117. Id. (stating that "[m]ere 'generalized commands,' however, will not suf-
fice to authorize such fees") (quoting Runyon, 427 U.S. at 186).
118. Id. at 1967. The amendments containing explicit authority for the recov-
ery of attorneys' fees are 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) and 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (2) (E). For
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tions 107 and 113 of CERCLA."1 9 The Court concluded that the
absence of explicit authorization in these sections suggests a delib-
erate congressional decision not to authorize recovery in a private
cost recovery action.12 0
Third, the court rejected Key Tronic Corporation's argument
that the United States government can recover attorneys' fees even
though CERCLA does not use the words "attorneys' fees" and that
the costs of "enforcement activities" encompasses attorneys' fees in-
curred in private cost recovery actions.' 2 ' In response, the Court
noted that Congress affirmed governmental recovery by redefining
"response" to include "enforcement activities," but that a private ac-
tion under CERCLA section 107 is not an "enforcement activity." 22
The Court stated that the inclusion of this private cost recovery ac-
tion would "stretch the plain terms of 'enforcement activities' too
far," and held that "enforcement activities" did not explicitly in-
clude a private action under section 107.123
2. Recoverability of attorneys'fees incurred in the identification of
responsible parties
The Key Tronic Court next addressed the recoverability of attor-
neys' fees expended in the identification of responsible parties. The
Court stated that the American Rule does not apply to non-litiga-
tion fees.' 24 However, to be recoverable, the attorneys' fees must be
closely connected to the actual cleanup to constitute a "necessary
cost of response" under CERCLA section 107(a) (4) (B). 125 The
Court noted that Key Tronic's identification of other PRPs served a
119. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967. Petitioner's brief stated that § 9659(f) ex-
pressly provides for recovery of attorneys' fees, because § 9659(c) is a citizens suit
provision which authorizes "the imposition of civil penalties, but not the recovery
of response costs." Petitioner's Brief at 22-23, Key Tronic (No. 93-376). Furthermore,
the petitioner reasons that the term "enforcement activities" is a more expansive
term and "encompasses a broader meaning than 'attorneys' fees.'" Id. at 23.
120. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967.
121. Id. at 1966. The petitioners contended that private parties are entitled to
costs of "enforcement activities." Petitioner's Brief at 17, Key Tronic (No. 93-376).
Under CERCLA, private parties undertake activities which would constitute "en-
forcement activities" if performed by EPA. Id. Key Tronic also asserted that the
dictionary meaning and "common understanding" of the word "enforce" makes it
applicable to a private party. Id.
122. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1966.
123. Id.
124. Id.; see FMC, 998 F.2d at 847-48. Key Tronic argued that non-litigation
related attorneys' fees do not fall under the American Rule. Petitioner's Brief at
26, Key Tronic (No. 93-376).
125. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1966. For further discussion of the term "costs of
response," see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
18
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statutory purpose other than the reallocation of costs by signifi-
cantly benefitting the entire clean up, and was distinguishable from
litigation expenses. 126 Accordingly, the attorneys' fees expended in
the identification process were held to be recoverable because of
their proximity to the actual cleanup. 127
3. Recovery of attorneys'fees associated with EPA negotiations
Addressing the third issue, the Court held that the attorneys'
fees incurred during the negotiation and preparation of the con-
sent decree between Key Tronic and EPA were not recoverable as a
cost of response. 128 The Court noted that the documents that Key
Tronic attorneys prepared may have assisted with the cleanup, but
the work's primary focus was the protection of Key Tronic as a de-
fendant in liability proceedings. 129 Thus, the legal fees incurred in
generating the consent decree were not encompassed within the
"necessary costs of response."130
4. Dissent
The dissent in Key Tronic disagreed with the Court's holding
regarding the non-recoverability of attorneys' fees expended in a
private cost recovery action, 31 asserting that the plain language of
section 107(a) (4) (A) and (B) and section 101(25) authorizes a pri-
vate party to be awarded the costs incurred in a cost recovery ac-
tion. 13 2 The dissent reasoned that a cost recovery action is included
within the scope of "enforcement activities" of a private party be-
cause it would not "stretch the plain terms of the phrase 'enforce-
ment activities' too far"'33 and it is the "only 'enforcement
activit[y]' he can conceivably conduct." 3 Noting that the term "en-
forcement activities" often characterizes government prosecution,
the dissent asserted that the term has other meanings, including
126. Key Troni, 114 S. Ct. at 1966.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1968.
129. Id.
130. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1968.
131. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. Id. For a discussion of the use of plain language in statutory interpreta-
tion and its applicability to CERCLA, see supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
133. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1969 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1968.
19951
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the enforcement of private judgements and the enforcement of
contractual obligations. 135
The dissent stated that the statutory text does not have to in-
dude the "magic phrase" specifically enumerating "attorneys' fees"
to meet the requirements of explicitness required in Runyon, be-
cause the costs of enforcement activities "naturally (and indeed pri-
marily) include attorney's fees."' 36 Furthermore, the dissent
rejected the majority's reasoning that the inclusion of recoverability
of attorneys' fees in two sections of the statute and the omission of
it in others suggests deliberate congressional exclusion, because at-
torneys' fees are clearly included within "enforcement activities" of
private parties. 3 7
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF KEY TRONiC
CERCLA was enacted to provide a uniformly prompt and effec-
tive cleanup of waste disposal sites throughout the nation, and pri-
vate cost recovery actions are an important impetus to rapid
remediation.'38 Since these actions often generate sizeable legal
fees in both litigation and non-litigation activities, the recoverability
of these expenditures has become an important legal issue which
has enormous financial impact.139 The uncertainty of conflicting
federal circuit court decisions would precipitate needless delays in
cost recovery and frustrate CERCLA's goals. 140 Thus, the Supreme
Court appropriately addressed the issue to establish a national stan-
dard and provide certainty in cost recovery actions under CERCLA.
135. Id. at 1969 (stating that "[w]e have called the private rights of action
created by the Clayton Act 'vehicle [s] for private enforcement' of the law") (citing
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109 (1986)).
136. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1969 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 21-22. To assist the Federal Government's efforts
in the remediation of hazardous waste sites, Congress permitted private parties
who voluntarily participate in cleanups to bring suit to recover costs from other
PRPs. Id.
139. See Virk, supra note 10, at 1566. For further discussion of the financial
impact of attorney fee recovery, see supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
140. General ERec., 920 F.2d at 1422; Bolin, 759 F. Supp. at 710 ("Congress in-
tended § 107 as a powerful incentive for these parties to expend their own funds
initially without waiting for the responsible persons to take action."); seeJordan,
supra note 12, at 834-36 (commenting that recovery of attorneys' fees gives PRPs
incentives to voluntarily initiate cleanups); see also Karen M. McGaffey, Denying Pi-
vate Attorney Fee Recovery Under CERCLA: Bad Law and Bad Policy, 17 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REv. 87, 98-100 -(1993) (stating provisions which encourage initiation of volun-
tary cleanup are essential to attainment of CERCLA's goals); Kaplan, supra note 48,
at 280-81 (noting plaintiff's recovery of attorneys' fees could prevent prolonged
delays by PRP in cost recovery actions).
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A. The American Rule and Requirement of Explicitness
The Supreme Court's decision in Key Tronic is largely based on
the American Rule and statutory interpretation. 141 In the analysis of
recoverability of attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting a private
response cost recovery action, both the majority and the dissent
claimed their rationale was consistent with the American Rule,
which denies recovery of attorneys' fees incurred in litigation ab-
sent explicit authorization from Congress. 142 Recovery under this
rule is dependent upon the scope of the term "explicit," and both
the majority and the dissent examined the plain language of the
statute to determine if attorneys' fees are explicitly authorized in
section 107.143 However, the dual interpretations of the identical
statutory language effectuated diametrically opposing results.'4 A
strict interpretation of the explicitness required in Runyon, how-
ever, was consistent with the majority's denial of attorney fee
recovery.' 45
Invoking a disparate interpretation of the plain language of
the statute and utilizing a similar analysis to that in General Elec-
tric,'46 the dissent stated that the term "explicit" did not require a
"magic phrase" expressly specifying "attorneys' fees."' 47 The dissent
justified adherence to Runyon by the fact that CERCLA sections 107
and 101 (25) both contain explicit authorization for the recovery of
enforcement activity costs, which the dissent asserted "naturally" in-
141. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1964-68. The Key Tronic decision embodied much
of the rationale encompassed by the United States' brief. The Respondent rea-
soned that Key Tronic should be denied recovery of attorneys' fees as response
costs because, in Alyeska, the Court ruled that absent explicit statutory authoriza-
tion, federal courts may not award attorneys fees to prevailing parties. Respon-
dent's Brief at 6-7, Key Tronic v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994) (No. 93-
376). However, under § 107 of CERCLA, there is no explicit authorization to
award attorneys' fees in a cost recovery action brought by a private party. Id. at 10-
11. Furthermore, in other sections of CERCLA, Congress used explicit language to
authorize the award of attorneys' fees. Id. at 12-15. Although CERCLA authorizes
recovery of response costs and defines "response" to include enforcement activi-
ties, a contribution action is not an enforcement action. Id. at 16-25.
142. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1964.
143. Id. at 1965.
144. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (commenting "[c]ongressional inaction lacks
persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn
from such inaction")).
145. See Virk, supra note 10, at 1563. The strict approach requires adherence
to Runyon and Alyeska and a narrow interpretation of section 107(a) (4) (B) of CER-
CLA. Kaplan, supra note 48, at 274.
146. General Elec., 920 F.2d at 1415.
147. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1969 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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cluded attorneys' fees.' 48 However, this rationale was based upon
the dissent's determination that private cost recovery actions are
included within the term "enforcement activities." This was a piv-
otal determination in the Key Tronic decision, because section 107
of CERCLA authorizes recovery for "necessary costs of response"
and "response" is defined in section 101 (25) as including "enforce-
ment activities."149 If "enforcement activities" includes private cost
recovery actions it would constitute explicit statutory authorization
of cost recovery in such actions. Although CERCLA contains no def-
inition of "enforcement activities," the dissent reasoned that the
plain language interpretation incorporates a cost recovery action
into the term "enforcement activities" because that is the only en-
forcement activity that a private party can "conceivably conduct."150
The dissent also noted various private enforcement actions
such as the enforcement of private judgments and enforcement of
contractual obligations.' 5 ' The existence of these other meanings
contradict the dissent's assertion that a cost recovery action is the
only activity that a private party can conduct, and may be construed
as evidence of the lack of explicitness required by the American
Rule. Adding a degree of latitude without usurping the congres-
sional function, 152 the majority in Key Tronic held that the absence
of specific language could be overcome by statutory intent.'53 The
Court found that the lack of congressional intent to award recovery
of attorneys' fees in a private cost recovery action was evidenced by
Congress' inclusion of two express attorneys' fee awards in other
SARA amendments 154 and the omission of such awards in section
148. Id.
149. CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25). For further discussion of
§ 101 (25) of CERCLA, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
150. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1968 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1969.
152. See Shapiro, supra note 54, at 951 (stating that a court might consider the
application of a statute "not as a matter of 'statutory construction' but rather in
light of the policy embodied in the statute"); see generally Virk, supra note 10.
153. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965; see Shapiro, supra note 54, at 933 (noting
contextual interpretation may elucidate the intent); Popkin, supra note 46, at 868.
Judge Learned Hand stated:
[I]t is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the pri-
mary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the mean-
ing of any writing .... But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and
developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary, but
to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accom-
plish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to
their meaning.
Popkin, supra note 46, at 868.
154. CERCLA § 159(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f). The awarding of attorneys' fees is
expressly authorized in a suit brought by private citizens to enforce CERCLA. Id.
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107 of CERCLA, which pertains to private cost recovery actions, and
section 113(f), which expressly creates a cause of action for
contribution. 155
The "inclusio unius" canon of textual interpretation supports
the Court's determination that it was the intent of Congress to ex-
clude fee recovery. 15 6 This reasoning is consistent with West Virginia
University Hospitals'57 and Central Bank,158 where the Court em-
ployed the rationale of not supplying by judicial interpretation that
which Congress has omitted.' 59 Employing a narrow interpretation
of plain meaning and requisite explicitness, the majority in Key
Tronic stated that the inclusion of private cost recovery actions
would "stretch the plain terms of the phrase 'enforcement activity'
too far .... -"160 The majority's restricted interpretation of the scope
of the phrase "enforcement activities" is consistent with the confine-
ment ofjudicial discretion.161 It is based on the interpretative doc-
trines of plain language 62 and "narrow construction,"' 63 which
prevent judicial trespass beyond legislative intent.
The Court's narrow interpretation of enforcement activities
coupled with strict adherence to the explicitness reluirements of
the American Rule resulted in no infringement upon the discretion
of the legislature and no erosion of the American Rule.' 64 If Con-
§ 106(b) (2) (E), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (2) (E). In suits by the Attorney General, a
party mistakenly ordered to pay response costs may obtain reimbursement for costs
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) and (d) which may include recovery of attorneys'
fees. CERCIA § 106(b) (2) (E), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (2) (E).
155. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct at 1966-67. For a discussion of statutory silence, see
supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
156. For a discussion of the "inclusio unus, exclusio alterius" canon of statu-
tory interpretation, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
157. 111 S. Ct. at 1138.
158. 114 S. Ct. at 1439.
159. Id. at 1452.
160. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967; see also General Elec., 920 F.2d at 1422. In
General Ele., the court used similar, but varying language to express a conflicting
holding: "it would strain the statutory language to the breaking point to read...
[attorneys' fees] out of the necessary costs." 920 F.2d at 1422.
161. See Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 63. For a discussion ofjudicial restric-
tion, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
162. For a discussion of the plain language doctrine, see supra notes 45-47
and accompanying text.
163. For a discussion of narrow judicial construction, see infra note 164.
164. See Popkin, supra note 46, at 881.Justice Scalia has written: "our jurispru-
dence abounds with rules of 'plain statement,' 'clear statement,' and 'narrow con-
struction' designed variously to ensure that, absent unambiguous evidence of
Congress's intent, extraordinary constitutional powers are not invoked, or impor-
tant constitutional projections eliminated, or seemingly inequitable doctrines ap-
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gress wants to establish recoverability of attorneys' fees, it may in-
clude specific authorization by amending the statute. 165
B. Legislative History and Policy Considerations
In prior decisions, if the language of a statute lacked textual clar-
ity or explicitness, the Court examined the related legislative history
to determine congressional intent. 166 Noting that the House Com-
mittee Report on SARA confirmed only EPA's recovery of attor-
neys' fees,' 67 the Court determined that statutory silence regarding
the award of attorneys' fees in private cost recovery actions mani-
fested Congress' intent to exclude them,168 and, therefore, re-
frained from the analysis of legislative history which has been found
to be scarce and indefinite.169 Although various lower court deci-
sions have stated that the recoverability of attorneys' fees would
have a positive impact on the achievement of CERCLA's goals, 70 in
Key Tronic the Court did not directly address such policy considera-
tions.17 ' However, the Court made reference to the FMC decision
which stated that the desirability of fee recovery cannot override
the express authorization required in the American Rule and that it
is Congress, not the courts, that must make such a policy deci-
sion.17 2 The adoption of a broad interpretation of the statute, based
on CERCLA's remedial nature, must be tempered by the textual
165. FMC, 998 F.2d at 847. See Popkin, supra note 46, at 888 (stating that a
'Judicial decision to allocate law-making responsibility to the legislature makes
sense when the legislature is aware of a technically complex or politically contro-
versial issue").
166. See, e.g., Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 ("Where ... resolution of a question of
federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the
statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is
unclear.").
167. H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1985). The SARA
amendment redefining "response" to include "enforcement activities" confirms
"EPA's authority to recover costs for enforcement actions taken against responsible
parties." Id.
168. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965.
169. Dedham Water Co., 805 F.2d at 1081 (stating that CERCLA's legislative
history was shrouded in mystery); see also Harvey, supra note 30, at 223 ("Since
Congress hastily drafted CERCLA at the close of the ninety-sixth Congress, the
legislative history is almost non-existent."). For a discussion of CERCLA's indefi-
nite or contradictory legislative history, see supra notes 59 & 60 and accompanying
text.
170. For a discussion of decisions that involved policy considerations, see
supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
171. The Petitioner argued that the right of action under § 107 of CERCLA
encourages prompt cleanup by providing for recovery of response costs. Petition-
ers' Brief at 7, Key Tronic (No. 93-376). Additionally, it stated that the award of
attorneys' fees promotes CERCLA's goal of prompt cleanup. Id.
172. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967 n.13. In FMC the Tenth Circuit stated:
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exactitude required by the American Rule.173 Regardless of
whether the authorization of attorneys' fees would further the pur-
poses of CERCLA, it is not the role of the judiciary to compensate
for the congressional omission of explicitness.17 4
Consistent with stringent adhesion to the American Rule and
plain meaning textual interpretation, the Supreme Court has as-
serted the will of Congress as expressed in the textual language of
this statute. However, the Court has not precluded the future availa-
bility of attorney fee recovery. Instead, the Key Tronic decision has
established a national standard of certainty which can be overrid-
den by the legislature's specific authorization of the recoverability
of attorneys' fees in an amendment to CERCLA.' 7 5
C. Non-litigation Related Attorneys' Fees
The Key Tronic decision established parameters for the recovery
of non-litigation related attorneys' fees. 176 Stating that the Ameri-
can Rule requires explicit statutory authorization only for attorneys'
fees generated in litigation, the Court provided for the recovery of
expenditures for non-litigation legal activity, if it is closely con-
nected to the actual cleanup, and is a "necessary cost of response"
under CERCLA section 107(a) (4) (B).1 77 This holding is consistent
with CERCLA's goal of allocating costs of remediation to responsi-
We recognize that CERCLA is designed to encourage private parties to
assume the financial responsibility of cleanup by allowing them to seek
recovery from others. It may be true that awarding the litigation fees
incurred in that recovery would further this goal. Nonetheless, the effi-
cacy of an exception to the American Rule is a policy decision that must
be made by Congress, not the courts. The desirability of a fee-shifting
provision cannot substitute for the express authorization mandated by
the Supreme Court.
998 F.2d at 847 (citing Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 263-264).
173. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1020 (stating "[we cannot imply authority to
award attorneys' fees because we determine that such a rule would enhance public
policy"); see also FMC, 998 F.2d at 847. The court asserted that although recovery of
attorneys' fees might further the goals of CERCLA, "the efficacy of an exception to
the American Rule is a policy decision that must be made by Congress, not the
courts." Id. CERCLA policy considerations cannot outweigh the absence of explicit
textual authorization. Santa Fe 780 F. Supp. at 695-96.
174. SeeJones, supra note 10, at 418. The legislature, not thejudiciary, should
clarify ambiguous statutory terms. Id.
175. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1964.
176. Id. at 1968.
177. Id. The Court excluded recovery of legal fees such as those generated in
the consent decree negotiations between Key Tronic and EPA, determining that
this activity was not a "necessary cost of response" and stated that it was done "as
primarily protecting Key Tronic's interests as a defendant in the proceedings that
established the extent of its liability." Id.
1995]
25
Susco: Key Tronic Corporation v. United States: Recovery of Attorney's F
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
430 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JoURNAL [Vol. VI: p. 405
ble parties,178 but does not abridge the American Rule's restriction
on recovery of litigation fees.179
V. IMPACT
Prior to the Key Tronic decision, the federal courts' conflicting
decisions regarding litigation fee recovery led to inconsistent
awards of attorneys' fees.1 8 0 In Key Tronic, the Supreme Court estab-
lished a federal standard which denies private party recovery of at-
torneys' fees incurred in the litigation of a private cost recovery
action, and authorizes recovery of non-litigation fees if they are
closely connected with the actual clean-up and are a "necessary cost
of response" under CERCLA section 107.181 This decisive holding
will affect whether a party will decide to initiate an action, and the
manner in which it proceeds with litigation. The Key Tronic decision
affords a private party, who is considering commencement of a cost
recovery action, more certainty in regard to anticipated legal ex-
penditures. This certainty permits a private party to make a more
knowledgeable decision in pursuing response recovery. The poten-
tial recovery of litigation expenses could encourage private parties
to initiate a response action.'8 2 Alternatively, the high cost of legal
representation, coupled with the certainty of non-recovery, may dis-
courage parties from bringing suit.'88 The pending liability for an-
other party's litigation costs might encourage a PRP to consider an
efficient settlement, rather than engage in protracted litigation.
The legal fee recovery standard established in the Key Tronic
decision will help resolve pending litigation. The holding has al-
ready impacted several judicial determinations.'8 In March 1994,
while awaiting the Court's decision in Key Tronic, the District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia in Northwestern Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Atlantic Research Co.,' 8 5 deferred ruling on the question
178. For a discussion of the goal of assigning costs of remediation to responsi-
ble parties, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
179. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1968.
180. For a discussion of conflicting court decisions, see supra notes 67-102
and accompanying text.
181. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1968.
182. See Harvey, supra note 30, at 232 (noting attorney fee recovery is power-
ful incentive in initiation of response actions);Jones, supra note 10, at 420 (posit-
ing that Congress should amend CERCLA to include recovery of attorneys' fees,
thereby encouraging settlements and cleanups).
183. See McGaffey, supra note 140, at 98-99. For a discussion of the high costs
of legal representation, see supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
184. For discussion on the resolution of cases, see infra notes 186-89 and ac-
companying text.
185. 847 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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of whether attorneys' fees associated with environmental studies
constituted recoverable "response costs."186 In McNabb v. Riley,'
87
the Eighth Circuit followed Key Tronic and stated that recovery costs
did not implicitly include attorneys' fees.' 88 Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit denied recovery of attorneys' fees in a private party cost re-
covery action because they were not "necessary response costs" re-
coverable under CERCLA section 107(a) (4) (B) in Akzo Coatings,
Inc. v. Aiger Corp.189
It is uncertain whether the Key Tronic decision will impede the
primary goals of CERCLA. Proponents of attorney fee recovery have
asserted that denial of recovery would not appropriately apportion
costs to responsible parties. 90 It is questionable whether allowing
private parties to recover litigation costs would actually produce
more rapid cleanups. The anticipation of reimbursement of attor-
neys' fees might encourage excessive litigation and result in in-
creased legal fees and the exaggeration of actual costs.' 9 ' Also, the
denial of litigation-related fees, coupled with the recovery of preliti-
gation expenses, might encourage private parties to focus on the
research and documentation of other PRPs. The lack of recovery of
attorneys' fees could deter extensive litigation and promote negoti-
ated settlements because potential plaintiffs would be certain that
they would be responsible for their litigation fees even if they pre-
vailed. This would reduce the incidents of spurious litigation.
Whether or not the goals of CERCLA would be encumbered by the
denial of attorneys' fees, the Key Tronic Court determined that is not
the role of the judiciary to expand CERCLA's statutory language to
encompass private party recovery of attorneys' fees in private cost
recovery actions. 192 Congress may not have anticipated that the
Court would have interpreted CERCLA as denying recovery of at-
torneys' fees, 193 but the legislature may explicitly authorize statu-
186. Id. at 397.
187. 29 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1994).
188. Id. at 1306.
189. 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
190. See McGaffey, supra note 140, at 99. Under CERCLA, if the responsible
parties are to assume all the costs of response, the prevailing litigants should re-
cover their attorneys' fees. Id. The denial of recovery of attorneys' fees reduces
incentives for initiation of private cleanup. Id.; see also Harvey, supra note 30, at
232.
191. See Virk, supra note 10, at 1567 (asserting existence of fee recovery initi-
ates excess litigation regarding the amount of recovery).
192. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967 n.13.
193. See Harvey, supra note 30, at 231-32.
19951
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tory recovery if it so desires. 194 During the one-hundred and third
session of Congress, both the Senate and the House of Representa-
fives considered proposed bills reauthorizing CERCLA.195 The
House version of the bill redefined the term "response" to explicitly
include the recovery of attorneys' fees when the action is initiated
by the President, a State or an Indian Tribe. 196 However, there is no
express recovery of attorneys' fees designated for private parties in
a private cost recovery action.' 97
Representative Lehman from California proposed a separate
amendment which was incorporated as part of an en bloc amend-
ment to be introduced on the floor of the House. 98 This amend-
ment would permit private parties to recover attorneys' fees
incurred in a private cost recovery action.199 There were some re-
strictions on this right of recovery. A private party seeking recovery
must have first reached settlement with any potentially involved
194. See Popkin, supra note 46, at 888. For a discussion of congressional elec-
don to authorize recovery of attorneys' fees in a private cost recovery action, see
supra notes 165 & 173.
195. Superfund Reform Act, 103 H.R. 4916, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). This
bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Al Swift of
Washington. Superfund Reform Act, 103 S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
This bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator Baucus of Montana.
196. 103 H.R. 4916 § 606(5) (C). The definitions of § 101(25) of CERCLA,
pertaining to the terms "respond" and "response," would have been amended "by
striking 'related thereto' and inserting '(including attorneys' fees and expert wit-
ness fees) and oversight activities related thereto when such activities are under-
taken by the President, a State or Indian Tribe.'" Id.
197. Id.
198. Amendment to H.R. 3800, as reported (text of H.R. 4916), offered by
Representative Lehman (September 12, 1994).
199. Id. This amendment explicitly authorizes the recovery of reasonable at-
torneys' fees incurred in private recovery actions that have not reached final settle-
ment before the date of enactment, stating the following:
(5) ATTORNEYS' FEES IN CONTRIBUTION ACTIONS- (A) In any ac-
tion under section 107(a) and this section brought by a private party to
recover costs described in section 107(a) (4) (B), the following provisions
apply:
(i) The attorney fee portion of such costs that is reasonable and in-
curred after the date of the enactment of this paragraph is recoverable in
any such action-
(I) that is brought after the date of the enactment of this para-
graph; or
(II) that is brought before the date of the enactment of this para-
graph but that is not final of such date.
(ii) The attorney fee portion of such costs is not recoverable in any
cost recovery action that is final as of the date of the enactment of this
paragraph.
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governmental entities, 200 and a party could not obtain recovery
from a de minimus contributor.20' Furthermore, if a party bringing
the action rejects a settlement offer from a PRP, and the judgment
contains an award smaller than the proffered settlement, attorneys'
fees related to the action may not be recovered.20 2 However, Con-
gress adjourned for elections prior to consideration of these bills
and related amendments. The present session of Congress may
have the opportunity to consider the reauthorization of CERCLA.
At that time, the legislature may overturn the Key Tronic decision by
an express award of attorneys' fees in private party cost recovery
actions or it may affirm the Key Tronic decision by congressional
inaction. 203
Albertina D. Susco
200. Id. Recovery may not be obtained unless the following limitations are
met:
(iii) The attorney fee portion of such costs is not recoverable by any per-
son who has been identified as a potentially responsible party under this
Act by the United States, a State, or and [sic] Indian tribe, and that has
not either-
(I) resolved the person's liability to the United States, the State, or
Indian tribe, where the United States, State, or Indian tribe is responsible
for the response action at the facility: or
(II) agreed to perform a response action selected by the United
States, State, or Indian tribe is responsible for the response action at the
facility.
(iv) The attorney fee portion of such costs that is attributable to a
person's defense of a judicial or administrative enforcement action com-




202. Amendment to H.R. 3800, as reported (text H.R. 4916). The ammend-
ment states that the following limitations apply to awards that have been preceded
by rejected settlement offers:
(E) In any contribution action referred to in subparagraph (A), if-
(i) the person against whom the action is brought makes an offer of
settlement to the person bringing the action,
(ii) such offer is not accepted, and
(iii) the judgment finally obtained is not more favorable to the per-
son bringing the action than such offer of settlement, then the person
bringing the action may not recover any attorneys' fees related to the
action than such offer of settlement.
Id.
203. For discussion of the congressional option to authorize recovery of attor-
neys' fees in a private cost recovery action, see supra notes 165 & 173.
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